Entropy-based privacy against profiling of user mobility by Rodríguez Carrión, Alicia et al.
This document  is published at:
Rodriguez-Carrion, A., Rebollo-Monedero, D., Forné, J., 
Campo, C., Garcia-Rubio, C., Parra-Arnau, J., Das, S.K.
(2015).Entropy-Based Privacy against Profiling of User 
Mobility. Entropy, 17(6), pp. 3913-3946.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/e17063913
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License 
.  
Entropy 2015, 17, 3913-3946; doi:10.3390/e17063913
OPEN ACCESS
entropy
ISSN 1099-4300
www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy
Article
Entropy-Based Privacy against Profiling of User Mobility
Alicia Rodriguez-Carrion 1;*, David Rebollo-Monedero 2, Jordi Forné 2, Celeste Campo 1,
Carlos Garcia-Rubio 1, Javier Parra-Arnau 2 and Sajal K. Das 3
1 Department of Telematic Engineering, University Carlos III of Madrid, Avda. Universidad 30,
E-28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain; E-Mails: celeste@it.uc3m.es (C.C.); cgr@it.uc3m.es (C.G.-R.)
2 Department of Telematics Engineering, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), Campus Nord, C.
Jordi Girona 1-3, 08034 Barcelona, Spain; E-Mails: david.rebollo@entel.upc.edu (D.R.-M.);
jforne@entel.upc.edu (J.F.); javier.parra@entel.upc.edu (J.P.-A.)
3 Computer Science Department, Missouri University of Science and Technology, 325B Computer
Science Building, Rolla, MO 65409-0350, USA; E-Mail: sdas@mst.edu
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: arcarrio@it.uc3m.es;
Tel.: +34-91-624-6234.
Academic Editor: Kevin H. Knuth
Received: 9 March 2015 / Accepted: 8 June 2015 / Published: 10 June 2015
Abstract: Location-based services (LBSs) flood mobile phones nowadays, but their use
poses an evident privacy risk. The locations accompanying the LBS queries can be exploited
by the LBS provider to build the user profile of visited locations, which might disclose
sensitive data, such as work or home locations. The classic concept of entropy is widely used
to evaluate privacy in these scenarios, where the information is represented as a sequence of
independent samples of categorized data. However, since the LBS queries might be sent
very frequently, location profiles can be improved by adding temporal dependencies, thus
becoming mobility profiles, where location samples are not independent anymore and might
disclose the user’s mobility patterns. Since the time dimension is factored in, the classic
entropy concept falls short of evaluating the real privacy level, which depends also on the
time component. Therefore, we propose to extend the entropy-based privacy metric to the
use of the entropy rate to evaluate mobility profiles. Then, two perturbative mechanisms
are considered to preserve locations and mobility profiles under gradual utility constraints.
We further use the proposed privacy metric and compare it to classic ones to evaluate both
synthetic and real mobility profiles when the perturbative methods proposed are applied.
The results prove the usefulness of the proposed metric for mobility profiles and the need
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for tailoring the perturbative methods to the features of mobility profiles in order to improve
privacy without completely loosing utility.
Keywords: location-based services (LBSs); entropy; privacy; perturbative methods;
location history
1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the growth of a rich variety of information and communication
technologies. As a result, users enjoy applications striving to tailor information exchange functionality
to their specific interests. Examples of these applications comprise location-based services (LBSs),
personalized web search and multimedia recommendation systems. In the specific example of LBSs,
they open up enormous business opportunities, encompassing intelligent personal assistants, concierge
and emergency services, entertainment and advertising, among others. These services are also the result
of recent advances in positioning techniques, such as the global positioning system (GPS), location-based
social networks (where users tag significant places) or location techniques based on cellular or WiFi
networks (where users’ locations are inferred by associating the signal strength received by their mobile
phone with information about the closest transmission points and their position).
Many of these location services build upon, or lend themselves to, the creation of user profiles.
However, user profiles by themselves, but especially when combined across several information services,
pose evident privacy and security risks. On the other hand, it is precisely the availability to a system of
such sensitive information that enables such intelligent functionality. Therefore, the need for preserving
privacy without compromising the utility of the information emerges naturally. Hard privacy [1] is
one of the existing privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) [2] that consists of the preservation of the
privacy by the user itself by minimizing, obfuscating or perturbing the information released, without
the requirement of trusted intermediaries. In principle, by perturbing the confidential data prior to its
disclosure, users attain a certain degree of privacy, at the expense of degrading the system performance
(or utility). The existence of this inherent compromise is a strong motivation to develop quantifiable
metrics of privacy and utility and to design practical privacy-enhancing, data-perturbative mechanisms
achieving serviceable points of operation in this privacy-utility trade-off.
This work focuses on the specific scenario of the privacy risk associated with the profiling of user
mobility arising from the use of LBSs and user locations based on the identifier of the cell to which
the user’s phone is attached to (as opposed to the numerous privacy analysis on GPS-based location).
When using LBSs in mobile phones, such as weather, traffic or news widgets, to name a few of the most
basic services that depend on the user location, the user’s phone sends, quite frequently, a service request
together with the user location, aiming to obtain the most up-to-date information. For this kind of service,
it is sufficient to know a coarse precision location; thus, cell-based location is suitable whilst diminishing
the battery consumption with respect to the GPS option. The LBS provider may, then, collect or disclose
to third parties sensible data related to the locations visited by the user. In this work, we distinguish
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two types of profiles that can be built from the collection of locations sent to the LBS provider. We
define the first one as the location profile, and it consists of the set of locations visited by the user and
the visit frequency for each one. This profile may disclose implicit information related to the user: her
home and work locations; if she has children (the number of visits to a kindergarten or school is high);
if she may suffer from some chronic disease (the number of visits to a hospital is high); if she travels
much (there are visits to locations located in many different countries); among others. In these cases, an
attacker aims at obtaining the most accurate probability distribution of the visits to each location. Then,
it would be easier for the attacker to derive the implicit information enclosed in the location profile if a
few locations concentrate many more visits, i.e., if the location profile is as different as possible than a
uniform distribution. There exist several metrics to measure privacy in this type of scenario, where a set
of labeled data exposes the user profile. Some of them are based on the concept of entropy of a set of
independent samples, but to the best of our knowledge, it has never been applied to the specific case of
sequences of cell-based locations.
Furthermore, we define a second type of profile that can be built by taking advantage of the frequent
LBS requests mobile phones usually send to obtain the updated information related to their location.
We denote it as the mobility profile, and it is defined as the temporal sequence of locations visited
by the user. Therefore, the stress on this profile lies on the correlations among the visited locations,
instead of considering the locations as independent events. In this case, an attacker will aim at correctly
predicting the next location of the user, given her past history of locations. With this profile, the adversary
could derive more refined information due to the knowledge of temporal dependencies. An innocent
example of personal mobility information disclosure might be the following one. If the untrusted LBS
provider knows, by inspecting the mobility profile, that the user goes from home (first most visited
location) to work (second most visited location) and then to a third location near a supermarket, the
provider might infer that the user regularly buys products at that supermarket. Therefore, the LBS
provider might leak this data to other related services, which can start sending advertisements or offers
of different shops offering the same products right before the user goes to her usual supermarket. This
behavior, which might result in being very effective for advertisement, is only possible when adding the
temporal component to the location profile to transform it into a mobility profile. The problem arising
in this situation is that not only the set of visited locations and their visit frequency are the target of a
privacy attack, but also the correlations among the visits to those locations constitute a privacy threat.
As demonstrated in [3], the correlations among location samples enclose a great deal of information
when aiming at predicting the next location of a user. Since this is the target of an adversary, we need to
measure privacy taking into account such correlations. However, the classical concept of entropy used
for the location profiles does not work on memory processes, because it is only applicable for sequences
of independent samples. Therefore, applying privacy metrics based on entropy to a mobility profile does
not reflect the real privacy level, since the temporal correlations among locations visits, which represent
the main component of a mobility profile, remain ignored. To the best of our knowledge, there exist no
privacy metrics addressing the extension from location profiles to mobility profiles. For this reason, we
propose to compare the use of classical entropy with respect to an extension of this concept for processes
with memory: the entropy rate. This general goal leads to the contributions stated next.
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Contribution and Organization
The main contributions of this work are the following ones:
 Jaynes’ rationale on maximum entropy methods [4,5] enables us [6] to measure the privacy of
confidential data modeled by a probability distribution by means of its Shannon entropy. In
particular, one may measure the anonymity of a user’s behavioral profile as the entropy of a relative
histogram of online activity along predefined categories of interest. Inspired by this principle, we
propose the use of Shannon’s entropy to measure the privacy of a sequence of places of interest
visited by a user (which we will refer to as the user’s locations profile), with the caveat that this
may only be appropriate for a series of statistically-independent, identically-distributed outcomes.
 Taking this a step further, we tackle the case in which a sequence of location data is more
adequately modeled as a stochastic process with memory, representing the (entire or recent)
history of a user moving across predefined, discretized locations. We propose extending the
more traditional measure of privacy by means of Shannon’s entropy, to the more general
information-theoretic quantity known as the entropy rate, which quantifies the amount of
uncertainty contained in a process with memory. In other words, we put forth the notion of
entropy rates as the natural extension of Jaynes’ rationale from independent outcomes to time
series. Concordantly, we propose the entropy rate as a novel, more adequate measurement of
privacy of what we will call user mobility profiles: profiles capturing sequential behavior in which
current activity is statistically dependent on the past, as is commonly the case for location data.
 The extension from location to mobility profiles requires a reconsideration of the privacy
preserving mechanisms. We propose two simple perturbative methods, previously used for web
search applications, looking for their suitability in these two profiling scenarios.
 Finally, we compare the results of calculating the privacy metrics proposed for different theoretical
processes of increasing memory, to finally analyze a real location and mobility profile, made up
of cell-based locations, which shows the usefulness of the proposed privacy metric. The work
ends up with a discussion of different aspects impacting the privacy level obtained and further
considerations to improve it in mobility profiling scenarios.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a detailed study of the
state-of-the-art in the two main topics covered in this work: hard-privacy, data-perturbative technologies;
and privacy metrics for data perturbation against user profiling. Section 3 states the problem, taking
care of the application scenario, the specific privacy model and metrics considered, as well as the
perturbative methods to be used. Section 4 exposes the formal analysis of the problem at hand. In
Section 5, the experimental data and results are described, together with a discussion on the findings and
limitations found. Finally, Section 6 gathers the main conclusions along with some future lines, and the
Appendices A to C include the proofs to the mathematical expressions derived in Section 4.
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2. Related Work
As exposed in [7], the evolution of LBSs and the associated location techniques lead to a privacy
degradation. Anonymous location traces can be identified by correlation with publicly-available
databases, thus increasing the possibility of disclosing sensitive data, such as home and work
locations [8] or specific points of interest of the user [9]. Therefore, users are exposed to different
kinds of attacks (e.g., tracking, localization or meeting attacks, among others [10]) with the available
information collected by LBS providers, which can disclose a great deal of the mobility profile of the
user. For this reason, privacy enhancement is key in order to tackle the increasing new threats that arise
from the evolution of LBSs.
The following is a brief overview of the state-of-the-art of user mobility profiles, since it is the target
to protect, along with a review on privacy-enhancing technologies and privacy metrics related to LBSs
and profiling of user mobility.
2.1. User Mobility Profiles
Human mobility has been extensively studied, both at a physical level (i.e., the length, pause times
and other features of people displacements), as well as at the specific domain level, as the impact of user
mobility in the performance of mobile networks and their applications, where our work is enclosed.
There are plenty of works on user profiling, depending on the technology used to collect the mobility
traces from which the profiles are made up (e.g., WiFi [11], GSM [12]) and also on the aspects to be
reflected in the profile and its immediate application. For instance, in [13], the authors analyze user
mobility profiles generated by processing GSM network-based mobility traces and considering the total
and daily number of different visited cells, the number of revisits to cells, the frequency of visits or the
residence time. Some works, like [14], extract similar features from this same network, like the series of
cell identifiers traversed by a user, and use this location history as the mobility profile to detect anomalies
in the behavior of the user.
More recent works deal with new types of data [15], such as the location information disclosed in
location-based social networks, to create user profiles that can help in content prefetching and rideshare
recommendation systems. Going a step further, some works [16] not only deal with profile construction,
but also with the comparison metrics among profiles, which can be applied to user recommendations in
social networks.
Probably one of the most interesting works on user profiling regarding our work is [17], where
the authors incorporate temporal features for the usual spatial profiles, making them more specific to
each user, and evaluate the degree to which individuals can be uniquely identified by knowing their
spatio-temporal profile. This is directly related to the mobility profiles that we will further define and the
increase in the user information they enclose due to the temporal aspects (correlations among locations).
2.2. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for LBSs
Many different privacy-enhancing techniques focused on LBSs and location profiling can be found
in the literature. The statistical disclosure control (SDC) community proposed many of them, aiming
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to prevent the disclosure of the contribution of specific individuals by inspecting published statistical
information. k-anonymity [18,19] is one of the proposed techniques. A specific piece of data on
a particular group of individuals is said to satisfy the k-anonymity requirement if the origin of any
of its components cannot be ascertained, beyond a subgroup of at least k individuals. The concept
of k-anonymity is a widely popular privacy criterion, partly due to its mathematical tractability.
However, this tractability comes at the cost of important limitations, which have motivated a number
of refinements [20–22].
In the context of statistical databases appears also the concept of differential privacy [23–25]. The
idea behind this approach is to guarantee that, after adding random noise to a query, if it is executed
on two databases that only differ on one individual, the same answer must be generated with similar
probabilities in both databases. Differential privacy is used for LBSs when aggregate location data are
published. However, our scenario is that of a single user sending requests to an LBS provider, which
is a slightly different case. In order to cope with this difference, the concept of geo-indistinguishability
has emerged recently [26,27]. It is a variant of differential privacy for the specific case of LBSs based
on the principle that, the closer two locations are, the more indistinguishable they should be. In other
words, given two close locations, they should generate the same reported location to the LBS provider
with similar probabilities.
Other widely-used alternatives, known as user-centric approaches, rely on perturbation of the location
information and user collaboration. In this last context, the authors in [28] propose the collaboration of
the users to exchange context information among the interested user and another one who already has
that piece of data. This way, many interactions with the LBS provider disappear, thus increasing the
location privacy by avoiding as many requests (with the user’s location attached to it) to the provider as
possible. On the other hand, users’ interactions pose in some cases additional privacy risks. That is the
case of the effect of co-location in social networks, as demonstrated in [29]. In these situations, even
if the user does not disclose her location, she might reveal her friendship and current co-location with
a user who does disclose her location. The authors then quantify the impact of these co-location data,
deriving an inference algorithm.
Regarding the use of location perturbation techniques, we already introduced the concept of hard
privacy [1,30], in its fundamental form of data perturbation carried out locally prior to its disclosure
(sometimes referred to as obfuscation), without the requirement of any trusted external party, but
inducing a compromise between the privacy attained and the degradation of the utility of the data
disclosed for the intended purposes of an information service. A wide variety of perturbation methods
for LBSs has been proposed [31]. We only briefly touch upon a few recent ones. In [32], locations and
the adjacency between them are modeled by means of the vertices and edges of a graph, assumed to
be known by users and providers, rather than coordinates in a Cartesian plane or on a spherical surface.
Users provide imprecise locations by sending sets of vertices containing the vertex representing the actual
user location. Alternatively, [33] proposes sending circular areas of variable centers and radii in lieu of
actual coordinates. Finally, we sketch the idea behind [34]. First, users supply a perturbed location,
which the LBS provider uses to compose replies sorted by decreasing proximity. The user may stop
requesting replies when geometric considerations guarantee that the reply closest to the undisclosed exact
location has already been supplied. Besides these approaches, a number of hard-privacy mechanisms
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relying on data perturbation have been formulated in an application context wider than LBSs, primarily
including online search and resource tagging in the semantic web. Indeed, an interesting approach to
provide a distorted version of a user’s profile of interests consists of query forgery. The underlying
principle is to accompany original queries or query keywords with bogus ones, in order to preserve
user privacy to a certain extent. The associated cost relates to traffic and processing overhead, but on
the other hand, the user does not need to trust the service provider nor the network. Building on this
simple principle, several protocols, mainly heuristic, have been proposed and implemented, with various
degrees of sophistication [35–37]. A theoretical study of how to optimize the introduction of bogus
queries from an information-theoretic perspective, for a fixed constraint on the traffic overhead, appears
in [38]. The perturbation of user profiles for privacy preservation may be carried out not only by means
of the insertion of bogus activity, but also by suppression [39]. These approaches constitute the basis of
the present work.
Finally, going a step further by preserving not only privacy related to locations understood as a set
of independent samples, but also the correlations among locations, the most recent works on location
privacy, like [40], take into account the sequential correlation between locations, aiming at protecting
the present, past and future locations, as well as the transitions between locations. The authors tackle
the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg problem and use the attacker’s estimation error as the privacy
metric. This problem is similar to our scenario, since the preserving of the privacy of the correlations
among locations is our main concern. However, we tackle the problem with a different approach, using
the entropy rate definition. On the other hand, whilst we do not propose any location privacy-preserving
mechanism (LPPM) (beyond a couple of naive approaches to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed
privacy metric), the authors of the mentioned work also defined a theoretical framework based on the
Bayesian Stackelberg approach to preserve location privacy.
2.3. Privacy Metrics for Data Perturbation against User Profiling
Quantifiable measures of performance are essential to the evaluation of privacy-enhancing
mechanisms relying on data perturbation, in terms of both the privacy attained and any degradation
of utility. In a recent study on privacy metrics [41], it is shown that many of them may be understood
from a unifying conceptual perspective that identifies the quantification of privacy with that of the error
in the estimation of sensitive data by a privacy adversary, i.e., privacy is construed as an attacker’s
estimation error.
Of particular significance is the quantity known as Shannon’s entropy [42], a measure of
the uncertainty of a random event, associated with a probability distribution across the set of
possible outcomes.
Some studies [43–48] propose the applicability of the concept of entropy as a measure of privacy, by
proposing to measure the degree of anonymity observable by an attacker as the entropy of the probability
distribution of possible senders of a given message in an anonymous communication system. More recent
works have taken initial steps in relating privacy to information-theoretic quantities [38,49,50].
A mathematically tractable model of the user profile is a histogram of relative frequencies of visited
locations, regarded as a probability distribution, on which we may compute information-theoretic
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quantities, such as Shannon’s entropy. Within the focus of this paper, an intuitive justification in
favor of entropy maximization is that it boils down to making the perturbed, observed user profile as
uniform as possible, thereby hiding a user’s particular bias towards certain visited places. A much richer
argumentation stems from Jaynes’ rationale behind entropy maximization methods [4,5], more generally
understood under the perspective of the method of types and large deviation theory [42]. Under Jaynes’
rationale on entropy maximization methods, the entropy of an apparent user profile, modeled by a relative
frequency histogram, may be regarded as a measure of privacy or, more accurately, anonymity. The
leading idea, proposed in [38,51], is that the method of types from information theory establishes an
approximate monotonic relationship between the likelihood of a probability mass function (PMF) in a
stochastic system and its entropy. Loosely speaking and in our context, the higher the entropy of a profile,
the more likely it is, and the more users behave according to it. This is of course in the absence of a
probability distribution model for the probability mass functions, viewed abstractly as random variables
themselves. Under this interpretation, entropy is a measure of anonymity, not in the sense that the user’s
identity remains unknown, but only in the sense that the higher likelihood of an apparent profile, believed
by an external observer to be the actual profile, makes that profile more common, hopefully helping the
user go unnoticed.
3. Entropic Measures of User Privacy, the Adversary Model and Perturbative Mechanisms
In this section, we describe the scenario where the privacy enhancement techniques will be applied,
as well as the theoretical foundation of such techniques. First, we describe how mobility is represented
in our scenario, highlighting the difference with respect to the GPS-based mobility representation. Next,
once we have defined the data to protect and their representation, we need to know which mechanisms
to use in order to enhance the user’s privacy. However, in order to evaluate the mechanisms, we first
need to define how to measure the privacy level attained. This topic will lead to a discussion on how a
concept, such as entropy, is a good privacy measure and how to extend it to the domain of time series
through the use of entropy rates. Finally, after defining a quantitative measure of privacy, we propose a
perturbative method to enhance user’s mobility data privacy under certain utility constraints.
3.1. User Mobility Profiling and the Adversary Model
Users of an LBS disclose trajectories, i.e., sequences of positions, to a service provider. With a
small loss of generality for the purposes of user profiling on the basis of behavior, we assume that
those positions are not treated in the form of space coordinates, but categorized into a predefined, finite
set of labeled symbolic locations. The movement scenario is divided into different regions, each one
tagged with a unique identifier. The user moves across this scenario, and each time she enters a different
region, the identifier corresponding to that region is recorded as what is known as location history or
trace, L. This kind of representation allows recording sequences, such as locations represented by
GSM/UMTScells, WiFi coverage areas or sequences of concrete places (office, home, market, gym,
etc.). This assumption will enable us to model trajectories as random processes with samples distributed
in a finite alphabet. In Figure 1, we can see the track of a user that corresponds to the location history
L = afebdihgkjnml.
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Figure 1. Movement scenario divided in regions and the trajectory followed by the user.
Further, the data contained in a user’s trace allow us to define two types of user profile, the location
profile and the mobility profile. In the following subsections, we define and comment on these two types
of profiles, along with their corresponding adversary models. In the description of those profiles, we
describe the connection with the concepts of entropy and the entropy rate as privacy criteria. Additional
details on the role of those information-theoretic quantities are provided in Section 3.2.
3.1.1. Location Profile
The location profile is defined as the probability distribution of the visits to each of the locations in
the set of visited locations of the user, i.e., the relative frequency of visits of the user’s visited location
set. This is analogous to the histogram of the relative frequency of the different search categories, in
the case of the web search presented in [38,52]. This profile reveals information related to different
locations, independently of the rest of the visited locations and correlations among them. For instance,
an attacker may be interested in knowing the probability distribution of the visits in order to know
several pieces of related data, such as: home or work locations, which are demonstrated to be very easy
to derive [3,12], even when the attacker has access to just a few LBS requests [53]; if the user travels
to many different countries; if the user usually visits (the relative visit frequency is high) some hospital,
religious or political organization, children school, sports center, among others. The attacker, say the
LBS provider or a third party to whom the provider relinquishes the user location profile, might use this
information to provide personalized advertisement or vary prices depending on the user’s demand (e.g.,
if the frequency of the cumulative visits to locations in a different country to the one with the highest
number of visits is high, it can be derived that the user travels frequently, thus she will be prone to book
flights at higher prices, because traveling might be part of her work). A high number of visits to a hospital
or a religious or political-related venue can have also an impact when looking for jobs or insurances.
 Definition (location profile): Let L be a random variable (r.v.) representing the location of a given
user, from an alphabet of predefined location categories L . The time of the location referred
to is chosen uniformly at random. We model the location profile of said user as the probability
distribution of L; precisely, the probability mass function (PMF) pL of the discrete r.v. L. Thus,
pL(l) is the probability that the user is at location l 2 L at any given time. In other words, pL(l)
represents the relative frequency with which the user visits this location.
 Example: Examples of location categories that may characterize the behavioral profile of a user
include categories, such as “work”, “home”, “car”, “subway”, “restaurant”, “movie theater” and
“out of town”. These could be inferred from geographical locations with the help of an appropriate
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map. Figure 2 depicts a simple example of a location profile on a location alphabet with a few
categories.
0%
25%
50%
work home transportation outdoor leisure
𝑝𝐿 𝑙
𝑙
Figure 2. Example of location profile pL as a probability mass function
(PMF) or histogram of relative frequencies on a simple location alphabet L =
f“work”, “home”, “transportation” and “outdoor leisure”g, inferred from geographical
locations.
 Adversary model: The adversary model for the location profile is, in this case, estimating the
visit probability distribution as accurately as possible, by inspecting the locations attached to
the LBS requests. To this end, the adversary could utilize a maximum likelihood estimate of
the distribution, directly as the histogram of relative frequencies, simply by counting observed
locations, or any other well-known statistical techniques for the estimation of probability
distributions, such as additive or Laplace smoothing.
Our adversary model contemplates what the attacker is after when estimating those location
profiles. According to [6] and in line with the technical literature of profiling [54,55], we assume
the attacker’s ultimate objective behind profiling is to target users who deviate significantly from
the typical location profiles. This is known as individuation, meaning that the adversary aims at
discriminating a given user from the whole population of users or, said otherwise, wishes to learn
what distinguishes that user from the other users.
We would like to remark that our interpretation of Shannon’s entropy as a measure of profile
likelihood is clearly consistent with the assumptions made about the adversary and, in particular,
with its objective for constructing location profiles. Specifically, the higher the Shannon entropy
of a location profile, the larger the number of users sharing this location pattern and, therefore, the
less interesting is the profile to an attacker assumed to target peculiar users. We hasten to stress that
the Shannon entropy is, accordingly, a measure of anonymity, rather than privacy, in the sense that
the obfuscated information is the uniqueness of the profile behind such location patterns, rather
than the actual profile itself.
Another interpretation of Shannon’s entropy as an anonymity metric stems from the intuitive
observation that the higher the entropy of the distribution, informally speaking, the flatter the
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distribution and the less information the attacker could derive about predictable locations. In other
words, if all of the locations have the same visit frequency, the attacker can know the visited
locations, but not which of them is more important.
3.1.2. Mobility Profile
The mobility profile is defined as the joint probability of visited locations over time or, equivalently,
as the sequence of conditional probabilities of the current location, given the past history of locations.
In this case, locations are not considered independently as in the user’s location profile, but the most
important component is the correlation among different locations, i.e., the short- and long-range temporal
dependencies among them. In this case, an attacker will aim at predicting the next location that the user
will visit, given the past history. The predictions about future locations provide a further refinement for
advertisement purposes: the advertiser knows not only which product might be most interesting for the
user regarding her visited locations, but also when to offer it for maximizing the impact of the ad. For
instance, suggesting some entertainment activity might be more effective if by the mobility profile, the
attacker finds that the user did not go from home to work, as usual, which might indicate a weekend or
holiday. The adversary’s goal is then to be able to predict as accurately as possible the next location of
the user, given her past mobility history. There exists many prediction algorithms that can be used to
do so [56], and their success depends on the predictability of the mobility history. As demonstrated
in [3], the temporal dependencies among the locations visited by the user enclose information that
noticeably increases the predictability of the mobility. In that study, the authors define the concept
of predictability, closely linked to the entropy rate of the sequence, and demonstrate that it constitutes an
upper bound on how much of the time we could correctly predict the next location of the user, given her
past mobility history. After analyzing real mobility histories of thousands of users, they conclude that
we could correctly predict the next location of a user 93% of the time on average.
 Definition (mobility profile): More precisely, for each user, we define a stochastic process
(Lt)t=1;2;::: representing the sequence of categorized locations over discretized time instants
t = 1; 2; : : : Concordantly, the corresponding location Lt at time t is a discrete r.v. on the alphabet
of predefined location categories L introduced earlier. We define the mobility profile of the user
as the joint probability distribution of locations over time,
pL1 L2;:::;Lt 1; Lt; Lt+1;:::(l1 l2; : : : ; lt 1; lt; lt+1; : : : );
which may be equivalently expressed, by the chain rule of probabilities, as the sequence of
conditional PMFs of the current location Lt given the past location history Lt 1; Lt 2; : : : , i.e.,
pLt jLt 1;Lt 2;:::(lt j lt 1; lt 2; : : : ):
Discretized times could be defined in terms of fixed time intervals, such as hours or fractions
thereof, or more simply, but less informatively, as times relative to a change in activity of the user,
so that the actual logged data are the order of the given locations in time, but not their duration.
 Example: Following up with the simple example of Figure 2, with location alphabet L =
f‘work’, ‘home’, ‘transportation’ and ‘outdoor leisure’g, the mobility profile now incorporates
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time information, in the form of fixed time intervals, say 15 min. In this manner, one could record
the average time spent at work, at home, on the road or at various types of outdoor leisure activities
and also the mobility patterns involving said locations. With a more detailed location alphabet,
one may detect that a user predictably goes to work directly from home, or to the movies, or to a
restaurant after work on a given day of the week.
 Adversary model: The mobility profile, characterized by the probability distribution of categorized
locations across time, serves to effectively model the knowledge of an adversary about the future
locations of a user and raises the concern that motivates our contribution. Since predictability is
directly linked to the entropy rate of the mobility profile as a stochastic process, rather than the
entropy (the higher the entropy rate, the lower the predictability, as shown in [3]), we could use
this information theory concept in order to quantify the privacy of the user mobility profile in such
a way that the less predictable a user is (the higher her entropy rate is), the higher her mobility
profile privacy will be.
Analogously to the adversary model for location profiles, we also incorporate here the objective
behind such profiling and assume an attacker that strives to find users with atypical mobility
profiles. Jaynes’ rationale behind the entropy-maximization method allows us to regard the entropy
rate (formally presented next) as an anonymity metric that is consistent with this objective.
Table 1 summarizes the main properties of the attacker model considered above, both for location and
mobility profiling.
Table 1. Main conceptual highlights of the adversary model assumed in this work.
Who can be the
privacy attacker?
Any entity able to profile users based on their location and mobility
patterns is taken into account. This includes the location-based service
(LBS) provider and any entity capable of eavesdropping on users’
location data, e.g., Internet service providers, proxies, users of the same
local area network, and so on. Further, we also contemplate any other
entity that can collect publicly-available users’ data. This might be the
case of an attacker crawling the location data that Twitter users attach
to their tweets.
How does the
attacker model
location profiles?
The location profile of a user is modeled as the probability distribution
of their locations within an alphabet of predefined location categories.
Conceptually, a location profile is a histogram of relative frequencies of
user location data across those categories.
How does
the attacker
represent
mobility profiles?
The mobility profile of a user is modeled as the joint probability of
visited locations over time. This model is equivalent to the sequence of
conditional probabilities of the current location, given the past history
of locations.
What is the
attacker after
when profiling
users?
We consider the attacker wishes to individuate users on the basis of their
location and mobility patterns. In other words, the adversary aims at
finding users who deviate notably from the average and common profile.
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3.2. Privacy Model and Additional Discussion on Entropy and the Entropy Rate as Privacy Measures
This work considers an abstract privacy model in which individuals send pieces of confidential data,
related to each other in a temporal sequence, to an untrusted recipient. This intended recipient of the
data is not fully trusted. In fact, it is regarded as a privacy adversary capable of constructing a profile
of sensitive user interests on the basis of the observed activity or prone to leaking such observations
to an external party who might carry out the profiling. Disclosure of confidential data to such untrusted
recipient poses a privacy risk. However, it is precisely the submission of detailed data on preferences and
activity that enables the desired, intelligent functioning of the underlying information system. Although
this abstraction is readily applicable to a wide variety of information systems, we focus our exposition
on the important example of LBSs.
We have mentioned in our review of the state-of-the-art, Section 2.3, that the anonymity of a profile
can be quantified in terms of the Shannon entropy of the probability distribution representing the
histogram of relative frequencies profiling user behavior [6]. We also related this interpretation of
entropy to our description of privacy attacks based on user profiling in Section 3.1. The work cited
argues in favor of the use of this information-theoretic measure capitalizing on Jaynes’ rationale for
entropy maximization methods. Roughly speaking, Jaynes’ argument boils down to postulating that
high entropy is more common than low entropy. In the context of privacy, high-entropy profiles are more
frequent and, thus, more anonymous.
More sophisticated user profiling may be carried out if the privacy adversary exploits the statistical
dependence among location samples over time, in order to infer temporal behavioral patterns. This
responds to the observation that the disclosure of a sequence of user locations poses a clear privacy risk,
especially when these locations are viewed in conjunction and time is factored in. Examples include
answers to questions, such as: Where does a user commonly go after work, before heading back home?
On a typical weekend, what is the user’s preferred activity after leaving their house? What route does
the user usually follow to get to work or back home?
The natural extension of the measurement of anonymity by means of entropy to the case at hand,
namely random processes with memory, is the entropy rate, formally defined in Section 4.1. Because
the definition of the entropy rate is approximated by the entropy of a large block of consecutive samples
(normalized by the number of samples), the very same argument in favor of entropy can be extended
to the entropy rate, the latter more suitable to user profiling in terms of trajectory patterns rather than
individual locations.
We should remark that entropy has been often proposed as a privacy metric, on the intuitive basis
that it constitutes a measure of uncertainty, even though formally speaking, there exist many other
such measures, Rènyi entropy or variance, to name a couple. Even though we acknowledge the
appropriateness of this intuition, we more formally resort to Jaynes’ rationale on maximum entropy
methods to argue, as in [6], that more entropic user profiles are also more common and, thus, less
idiosyncratic or characteristic of the specific habits of a particular individual. Consequently, the privacy
metric proposed here, namely the entropy rate of the stochastic process modeling the sequence of
discretized locations, represents a quantifiable measurement of the anonymity of the user, in the sense of
commonness, rather than of the confidentiality of the data at hand.
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In summary, we argue in favor of measuring the privacy of a user by means of the entropy of its
profile, mathematically modeled as a probability distribution across predefined behavioral categories, as
a measure of anonymity. We recalled in the state-of-the-art in Section 2.3 and discussed here and in
Section 3.1 that Jaynes’ rationale on entropy maximization methods enables us to interpret the entropy
of a user profile, mathematically modeled as a probability distribution across predefined behavioral
categories, as a measure of anonymity. The underlying principle is conceptually simple: more entropic
profiles are to be considered a priori also more common, so that entropy is a measure of commonness
and, thus, anonymity. Taking this a step further, in this work, we propose extending the more traditional
measure of privacy by means of Shannon’s entropy, to the more general information-theoretic quantity
known as the entropy rate, which quantifies the amount of uncertainty contained in a process with
memory. In other words, we put forth the notion of entropy rates as the natural extension of Jaynes’
rationale from independent outcomes to time series. The corresponding adversary model considers an
anonymity attacker striving to ascertain the identity of an individual from its behavioral profile; a harder
task when the number of likely candidates abounds.
However, entropy accepts other well-known additional interpretations [42], which we proceed to
discuss briefly in the context of privacy. These multiple interpretations make entropy a suitable criterion
in diverse privacy applications, each with a corresponding adversary model. Recall, for instance, the
well-known interpretation of entropy as a measure of the uncertainty of a random variable and of the
entropy rate as a measure of the uncertainty of a random process given its past. We already mentioned
that an intuitive justification in favor of entropy maximization is that it boils down to making the
perturbed, observed user profile as uniform as possible, thereby hiding a user’s particular bias towards
certain visited places. Less informally, the fact that entropy is a lower bound on the optimal (Huffman)
code length enables us to regard it as a quantifiable measure of the effort of a privacy adversary in
obtaining additional bits of information in order to narrow the current uncertainty down to a deterministic
outcome, under the perspective of equivalence between source coding and the game of twenty questions.
Consistently, Fano’s inequality lower bounds the probability of estimation error in terms of a conditional
entropy, in the sense of maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation, which can be readily applied to the
entropy rate, written as the conditional entropy of a future location of a user given the past history. Here,
MAP estimation might be construed as the action taken by a smart privacy attacker.
The arguments above justifies the use of entropy and of the more general information-theoretic
quantity known as the entropy rate, as formal, quantitative measures of the effort of a privacy attacker in
order to discriminate the identity of an individual from an observed behavior, among others with similar
location activity, or in order to characterize and predict its behavior, when the identity is known.
Under the interpretation given by Fano’s inequality, for example, the entropy rate H(L), equal to
the conditional entropy of the current location Lt given all past locations Lt 1; Lt 2; : : : , would bound
the probability of MAP estimation error of the current location pe in an alphabet of m possible location
categories according to:
pe >
H(L)  log 2
log(m  1) :
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The higher the entropy rate, the harder to predict the user’s current location from her past history.
Provided that the underlying stochastic process is stationary, this bound would be the same at any
given time.
With regard to estimating identities rather than predicting locations, Jaynes’ approximation relates the
likelihood pL(l) of a specific user profile l, represented by a histogram of relative frequencies, based on
n sample observations, with the entropy of the l regarded as a distribution, specifically, according to:
  1
n
log pL(l) ' D(lku) = logm H(l);
where D(lku) denotes the Kullback–Leibler divergence between l and the uniform profile u = 1=m
across m location categories. Again, the higher the entropy H(l) of the user profile l, the higher the
likelihood pL(l) of this profile among all users.
The specific unit of information, which would correspond to the basis of the logarithm in the entropic
quantity at hand, be it bit (base two), or nat(base e), can be chosen simply by convenience, as it would
merely represent a proportionality constant. In Fano’s inequality, this constant would be canceled out in
the bounding ratio. The binary base, however, would allow the more intuitive interpretation of binary,
that is yes/no questions or pieces of information, under the perspective of the aforementioned optimal
code length.
The fact that entropy admits multiple interpretations must be regarded as an advantage of a single,
unifying theoretical quantity, capable of addressing several privacy models and practical implementation
criteria. This multifaceted characterization is not unlike that in other universally-employed formalisms,
such as the mean squared error (MSE), which, in addition to mathematical tractability, offer practical
interpretations under various standpoints. For instance, on the one hand, the convexity of MSE implies
superadditivity, making it a suitable measure of compression quality whenever a few small deviations
are preferred to a single large error. On the other hand, MSE may be regarded as a second-order
Taylor approximation to any reasonable, symmetric nonlinear measure of distortion when operating at
high fidelity.
3.3. Perturbative Mechanisms
Following the reasons stated in the Introduction, particularly motivated by the advantages of
hard privacy against the reliance on trusted intermediaries, we shall investigate theoretically and
experimentally two data-perturbative strategies prior to the disclosure of trajectories, in order to trade-off
usability for privacy. In the first strategy, referred to as uniform replacement from now on, with certain
probability, samples are replaced with values drawn according to a uniform distribution over the alphabet
of possible categorized locations. In the second mechanism, which will be called improved replacement,
the same fraction of samples is replaced, although a more sophisticated policy is employed. Precisely,
the replacing samples are drawn from the distribution obtained from the solution to the problem for
optimized query forgery developed in [38]. We should point out that because the optimization carried
out was originally intended for memoryless processes and anonymity was measured by means of entropy
instead of the entropy rate, the aforementioned improved solution need not be optimal whenever the
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privacy attacker exploits existing statistical dependencies over time. Consequently, both mechanisms we
choose to evaluate are merely heuristics.
The probability of replacement is indicative of the degradation in data utility. As we will expose
in the next section that the theoretical analysis is equivalent for sample replacement and addition. In
this last case, the utility degradation is understood as an increase in the information sent to the LBS
provider, thus incrementing the energy consumption of the mobile device and, potentially, the economic
cost of data traffic. We consider here applications that can send location samples to the corresponding
LBS more frequently than in a normal situation (i.e., where no privacy-enhancing method is applied).
That allows one to send fake locations together with the original ones without degrading the service
provided, only increasing the cost associated with a more intensive communication. From now on, we
will talk about sample replacement, but keeping in mind that it could be extended to sample addition, by
slightly changing what we understand by utility in that case. Because sample values may occasionally
be replaced by themselves, especially if the number of location categories is small, counting the number
of effectively perturbed values is a more adequate measure of utility. While there is ample room for
the development of more sophisticated metrics of utility reflecting the quality of the LBS response, the
necessarily limited scope of this work prefers to cover the aspects of privacy and perturbation, as the first
insightful step towards the problem of privacy-enhanced perturbation of processes with memory.
4. Theoretical Analysis of Perturbative Methods and the Entropy-Based Privacy Metric
4.1. Notation and Information-Theoretic Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we shall follow the convention of uppercase letters for random variables (r.v.’s)
and lowercase letters for particular values they take on. For simplicity, all r.v.’s in this analysis take
on values in a finite alphabet. Probability mass functions (PMF) are denoted by p, sub-indexed by the
corresponding name of the r.v. when not understood from the context. For instance, we may denote the
PMF of an r.v. X at x by pX(x), or simply by p(x).
We review a few fundamental results from information theory. The reader may refer to [42] for
specific details and proofs. The Shannon entropy of an r.v. X with PMF p and finite alphabet X is
written interchangeably as H(X) or H(p). Recall that entropy is maximized for the uniform distribution,
and for this distribution only, and that the maximum attained is the logarithm of the cardinality of the
alphabet. Put mathematically, H(p) 6 log jX j, with equality if and only if p is the uniform distribution.
Throughout this work, all logarithms are taken to base two, and subsequently, the entropy units are bits.
Recall also that H(p) is a strictly concave function of p, in the sense that for any distributions p and p0
over the same alphabet and any  2 [0; 1],
H((1  ) p+  p0) > (1  ) H(p) +  H(p0);
with equality if and only if  = 0,  = 1, or p = p0.
Let:
(Xn)n2Z = : : : ; X 2; X 1; X0; X1; X2; : : :
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be a stationary random process with samples defined on a common alphabet X . Stationarity implies
that both the entropy sequences 1
n
H(X1; : : : ; Xn) and
H(XnjX1; : : : ; Xn 1) = H(X1jX2; : : : ; Xn)
are non-increasing and have a common limit, called the entropy rate, denoted here by HR(X). For n
large, either of these entropy quantities constitutes an arbitrarily accurate approximation to the entropy
rate of the process. We can compute these quantities by choosing an appropriate value of n, such that
the blocks capture the correlations of the process and calculating pX(XnjX1; : : : ; Xn 1) as the number
of blocks X1; : : : ; Xn normalized by the total number of blocks of length n, then applying the previous
formula HR(X) =  
P
pX(XnjX1; : : : ; Xn 1) log pX(XnjX1; : : : ; Xn 1).
Stationarity also implies that the samples of the process are identically distributed according to a
common PMF. When, in addition, they are statistically independent, the process, or the samples thereof,
is then called independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.). More colloquially, a process with independent
samples is called memoryless or without memory. For an i.i.d. process, entropy rate and the entropy
of individual samples coincide, that is HR(X) = HR(Xn). For a general stationary process HR(X) 6
HR(Xn), with equality if and only if the process is memoryless. The highest entropy rate is attained by
processes with independent, uniformly-distributed samples, that is HR(X) 6 log jX j, with equality if
and only if the process is uniformly distributed and memoryless.
4.2. Perturbative Mechanisms
Again, consider a stationary random process (Xn)n2Z with samples distributed on a common finite
alphabetX . We shall argue elsewhere that entropy rate is an appropriate privacy measure. We propose
two alternative privacy-enhancing perturbative mechanisms, in which individual samples of the random
process Xn are replaced with X 0n, with probability  and independently from each other, as follows.
 Uniform replacement: X 0n is drawn uniformly fromX .
 Improved replacement: X 0n is drawn according to the distribution obtained as the solution to the
maximum-entropy problem of [38].
Even though [38] was meant for sample addition rather than replacement, the mathematical
formulation turns out to be completely equivalent. However, we should hasten to point out that the
optimality guarantee of the cited work applies to entropies of individual samples, but not entropy rates
in general processes with memory. Consequently, the two alternative mechanisms described above are
merely heuristic in the context of this work. In both cases, the resulting perturbed process (X 0n)n2Z is
clearly stationary.
We shall call  the replacement rate. Because sample values may be conceivably replaced with
themselves, we propose the following utility measure, which more accurately reflects the actual impact
of the perturbative mechanism. Precisely, we define the perturbation rate  = PfXn 6= X 0ng, constant
with n on account of the stationarity of the processes involved, and observe that  6 , as only replaced
samples may be effectively perturbed, that is actually different.
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Even in the heuristic called improved replacement, the samples to be replaced are chosen randomly
and replaced independently of their original value. A truly optimal strategy, however, should choose
which samples to replace, exploit the statistical model of the memory of the process and be optimized
for  rather than  as a measure of utility. The scope of this work is limited to the analysis of the heuristic
mechanisms described, as the first step towards shedding some light on the problem of designing
perturbative strategies for processes with memory and with a truly optimal privacy-utility trade-off (or
privacy-cost qualitatively speaking if we would consider sample addition).
4.2.1. Uniform Replacement
We prove that uniform replacement on stationary processes with a strictly positive replacement
rate will always increase the entropy rate, unless the original process is uniformly distributed and
memoryless.
Lemma 1. Let S and U be independent r.v.’s, the latter uniformly distributed on the alphabet of the
former. Let T be a third r.v., in general statistically dependent on S. Take S 0 = U with probability ,
independently of S and T , and S 0 = S otherwise. Then, H(S 0jT ) > H(SjT ), with equality if and only if
either  = 0, or else S is uniform and independent of T (refer to Appendix A for the demonstration).
Theorem 1. Let X = (Xn)n2Z be a stationary random process with samples distributed on a common
finite alphabet X . Although the process X itself need not be independent, each of its samples Xn is
altered completely independently as follows. Each sample Xn is replaced by another r.v. Un, uniformly
drawn from the alphabet X , with probability , and left intact otherwise. Let X 0 = (X 0n)n2Z be the
resulting process, also stationary. Then, for any m > 0,
H(X 00jX 0 1; : : : ; X 0 m) > H(X0jX 1; : : : ; X m);
with equality if and only if either  = 0, or else X0 is uniform and independent of X 1; : : : ; X m. The
same inequality holds in the limit ofm!1 yielding entropy rates, that is H(X 0) > H(X), with equality
if and only if either  = 0, or else X is uniformly distributed and memoryless (refer to Appendix B for
the demonstration).
4.2.2. Uniform versus Improved Replacement
We show that in the case of memoryless processes that are not originally uniform, improved
replacement will require a lower replacement rate to achieve maximum entropy than that demanded by
uniform replacement. We shall also see that, when the cardinality of the alphabet is large, the perturbation
rate approaches the replacement rate.
In the perturbative mechanisms described earlier, define the critical replacement rate crit to be the
replacement rate  required for the entropy rate H(X 0) of the perturbed process (X 0n)n2Z to attain
its maximum possible value log jX j, achievable only when X 0 becomes memoryless and uniformly
distributed. Denote by crit the corresponding critical perturbation rate. Write:
pmax = max
x2X
p(x) > 1jX j ;
with equality if and only if X is uniformly distributed.
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Theorem 2. Assume the nontrivial case in which the original process X is not already independent,
uniformly distributed.
In uniform replacement,
 = 

1  1jX j

;
crit = 1;
crit = 1  1jX j :
In improved replacement, for any  > 1  1jX jpmax ,
 = (1  )
X
x
p(x)2 +   1jX j :
If the original process is i.i.d.,
crit = 1  1jX jpmax ;
crit = 1  1jX j   1jX jpmax
 
1 
X
x
p(x)2
!
:
Otherwise, in the general case of processes with memory,
crit = 1 and crit = 1  1jX j :
(refer to Appendix C for the demonstration).
Recall [42] that the Rényi entropy of order  of a discrete r.v. X with PMF pX is defined as:
H(X) =
1
1   log
X
x
pX(x)
: (1)
The value
P
x p(x)
2 = E p(X) in the theorem is directly related to the Rényi entropy of order two of
p(x), called the collision entropy. The sum of squared probabilities above is minimized for the uniform
distribution and maximized for a degenerate distribution, where the associated r.v. takes on a single value
with probability one.
Observe that in the case of uniform replacement, a large alphabet jX j implies that the perturbation
rate will approach the replacement rate, that is  ' , because of the unlikelihood of replacing a sample
by itself. In the case of improved replacement, the approximation requires not only jX j  1, but alsoP
x p(x)
2  1 and only holds for sufficiently large .
4.3. Entropy Estimation
As previously shown, entropy could be a suitable privacy metric, but we should pay attention to the
estimator used. Depending on the concrete application or data to focus on, the entropy estimation might
be different. In the case of human mobility, the location traces (that lead to locations and mobility
profiles) have specific features to take into account when estimating their entropy: strong long-range
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time-space dependencies, high probabilities of returning to some highly-frequented locations [12], the
high number of different visited places (the cardinality of the alphabet), among others.
Bearing these features in mind, we could come up with different entropy estimates, as described in [3],
each one of them accounting for different dependencies. As we shall see next, two of these estimates
will be the Hartley entropy and the Shannon entropy. Throughout this subsection, these entropies will
be denoted by H0(X) and H1(X) to emphasize their connection with the Rényi entropy, a family of
functionals widely used in information theory as a measure of uncertainty. Particularly, from (1), it is
straightforward to see that, when  = 0, Rényi’s entropy boils down to Hartley’s. In the limit when 
approaches one, this family of functionals reduces to Shannon’s entropy.
 Hartley entropy, H0(X), is the maximum attainable entropy value. We should recall that entropy
is maximized for the uniform distribution and for this distribution only and that the maximum
attained is the logarithm of the cardinality of the alphabet. Put mathematically:
H0(X) 6 log jXj (2)
with equality if and only ifX is drawn from the uniform distribution. Applied to our case, it would
be calculated considering the probability mass function of the locations trace (since no temporal
dependencies are considered) to be a uniform distribution of X different symbols (locations).
This entropy represents the highest possible uncertainty, as it does not take into account temporal
aspects nor the number of visits accumulated by each location.
 Shannon entropy, H1(X), is calculated as:
H1(X) =  
X
i
pX(xi) log pX(xi) (3)
In our scenario, pX(xi) is the probability of visiting location xi, which can be computed as
pX(xi) =
Nxi
N
, whereNxi is the number of visits received by location xi, andN is the total number
of visits (i.e., the length of the movement history). Shannon entropy considers the correlations in
the location visits frequencies, thus being lower (or equal if the probability to visit each location
is the same) than H0(X). Actually, this entropy would be lower than H0(X), such a PMF being
less uniform (i.e., as some locations receive many more visits than other ones). Location profiles
(because no temporal dependencies are considered) behave precisely like this: some locations
corresponding to home or work unite the majority of visits, whilst the rest of the locations are
much less visited.
 Entropy rate, HR(X), comes to the scene when dealing with stationary processes, as pointed out
in Section 4.1. It takes into account temporal dependencies between samples of the mobility
profile (in this case, we consider the mobility instead of the locations profile, because the time
dependencies must be considered). Since HR(X) takes into account more correlations of the
profile, the resulting value is lower than the previous ones (there is less uncertainty regarding the
next symbol of the profile) or equal if there are no temporal dependencies.
Applied to our case, we have a finite number of samples of the profile. Therefore, in order to
obtain a good estimate of HR(X), we should choose the optimal block size, n. This block size
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should be large enough so that the blocks include important long-term temporal dependencies
among location samples. However, since the length of the process (i.e., mobility profile) is limited
and the cardinality of the alphabet (i.e., the number of different locations) is high, there are not
many samples of long blocks. Thus, choosing a block size too large leads to a poor estimate of
pX(X1; : : : ; Xn). In order to use an appropriate value of n, we could use a well-known entropy
rate estimator based on Lempel–Ziv compression algorithms [3,57]. This way, the estimate of the
entropy rate can be calculated as:
H 0R =
lnN
N
P
i i
(4)
where i is the shortest substring starting at position i, which has not been seen before from
Position 1 to i  1, N being the number of samples of the profile.
5. Experimental Study: Results and Discussion
In the previous section, we formulated the theoretical problem of privacy-enhancing in processes with
and without memory and how we tackle it. In [38], the authors show some results when the mechanisms
proposed are applied to web queries, memoryless process and using a small number of categories. In this
section, we will see what happens when the scenario switches to LBSs, where the number of categories
increases, the probability model underneath becomes more complex and time starts playing an essential
role. First, we will show the privacy gain obtained after applying the privacy-enhancing mechanisms to
different processes, both synthetic and real, and finally, we discuss the differences that using real location
data bring to the generic problem.
5.1. Results
This section collects the results drawn from applying the perturbative mechanisms described in the
previous section to two different datasets. On the one hand, we will use several symbol sequences
generated from Markov processes and basic alphabets of two symbols. With these data, we will check
the performance of the perturbative methods in simple ideal conditions and observe the influence of
an increase of the process memory. On the other hand, real traces, taken from the Reality Mining
dataset [58], will be processed and compared with the results of Markov processes, since the real scenario
can be considered as an extrapolation of simple Markov processes in terms of memory and the cardinality
of the alphabet. More precisely, the location history considered collects the sequence of locations visited
by a user (each location represented as the identifier of the cell that the user’s phone was attached to at
each instant) during an academic year. It gathers more than 500 different cells (symbols) and more than
10,000 cell changes (profile samples or location history length).
In order to show the privacy enhancement evolution, each process is perturbed from 0% of replaced
samples (i.e., the original symbol sequence) to 100% of replacements (all samples are replaced), as
explained in [38]. For each process and percentage of replacements, 10 realizations are averaged. As
a general rule, when  = 0, we have the original process and, therefore, the original (and minimum)
entropy value. As  increases, the process starts to become a uniform distribution, which is reached
when  is maximum, i.e., when all samples are replaced by another one using the perturbative methods
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previously described, and therefore, for the maximum value of , the entropy value should be equal to
H0. We should recall that  is the percentage of replacements, but since, sometimes, the replaced sample
is equal to the original one, the real replacement rate is .
First, we will analyze how different entropy estimates work when applied to different kinds of
processes. More precisely, we will study the influence of an increase of the process memory in the
entropy estimation, as well as what happens when the process gets away from a uniform distribution, both
in terms of Shannon entropy and the entropy rate. For this last case, we will compare two approaches:
the estimation by means of block entropies and the Lempel–Ziv-based estimate.
Figures 3–6 show four different processes of 10,000 samples in each of the plots:
 An almost uniform distribution, drawn from an order-one Markov process with p(1j0) = 0:45,
p(0j1) = 0:55, p(1) = 0:55, H0 = H1 = HR = 0:993. This is the base case.
 An i.i.d. (not uniform) process, drawn from an order-one Markov process with p(1j0) = 0:8,
p(0j1) = 0:2, p(1) = 0:8, H0 = 1, H1 = HR = 0:772. Here, we keep the process memoryless
and change the probability distribution, such that there is a bias towards one of the two symbols of
the alphabet.
 A Markov process with p(1j0) = 0:2, p(0j1) = 0:05, p(1) = 0:8, H0 = 1, H1 = 0:772, HR =
0:374. In this case, we increase the memory of the process, keeping the cardinality and probability
distribution with respect to the second case.
 A real mobility trace taken from the dataset provided by the Reality Mining Project [58]. We can
only theoretically know H0 = 8:765 (drawn from the cardinality of the alphabet, i.e., the number of
different symbols representing the locations visited by the user), since the underlying probability
distribution is unknown. This means an increase both in the cardinality and the memory of the
process, due to the long-range dependencies of human mobility.
For each figure (process), the entropy value evolution with respect to the replacement rates is plotted.
The samples are replaced using the uniform perturbative method, i.e., choosing the new sample from
the original alphabet of the sequence with the symbols uniformly distributed. Each process has been
generated 10 times, and the results shown here are the average value of the entropy calculated in
each repetition.
In the first case shown in Figure 3, the process without replacements is already uniform; therefore,
there is no evolution in any of the entropy estimates. When the process is not uniform, but still i.i.d., such
as the one in Figure 4, H1 and HR coincide, as there is no temporal information that can be captured by
HR to lower the uncertainty, but they are lower than H0 and increase as the replacements turn the process
into a uniform one.
Figure 5 shows what happens when the process is not i.i.d. anymore. In this case, HR is lower than
H1, as it leverages the temporal information present now in the process to lower the uncertainty.
Finally, in Figure 6, we can see what happens when the number of different symbols (locations)
increases, as well as the memory of the process. In this case, we have 500 different symbols, which
leads to 500!
498!
= 249; 500 possible blocks of two symbols to compute HR using block entropies (the
blocks are of two symbols to compare with respect to the Markov processes). As the number of possible
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blocksissohighandthenumberofsamplesisonlyof10,000,astheprocessbecomesuniform,more
diferentblocksoftwosymbolscometothescene.Withthisnumberofsamples,wedonothaveevenone
occurenceofeachdiferentblock,theprobabilityofwhichwouldbepX(X1,...,Xn)=498!500!=4∗10−6.
Therefore,whencomputingHR(X),thevaluesoftheelementsofthesummationareverysmal,due
tothescarcityofoccurencesofeachpossibleblock.Thisscarcitybecomesmoresevereastheprocess
tendstouniformity.Thus,HR(X)decaystonearzeroasthenumberofreplacedsamplesincreases,as
shownintheﬁgure.AswepreviouslyexplainedinSection4.3,thisentropyestimationisbiasedbythe
smalnumberofsamplesavailableinthelocationhistoryoftheuser(evenwhenitcomesfromayearof
locationtracking).Thisisthereasonbehindconsideringadiferentestimator,liketheLempel–Ziv-based
one.Figure6showshowthisestimatorobtainsmorereasonableresults.BothHR(X)andHR(X)are
equalfortheoriginalsequence(ρ=0). However,inordertoanalyzetheprivacyimprovement,we
needanestimatethatworkswelforalofthereplacementratespan. Wecanalsoobservethat,asthe
cardinalityofthealphabetismuchhigher,itismoredifﬁculttochoosethesamesampleastheoriginal
oneineachreplacement,andtherefore,δ
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Nowthatweknowhoweachentropyestimateworksfordiferentprocesses,itistimetoapplysuch
estimatestotheproblemofprivacyenhancement.
Figures7and8representtheprivacylevelobtainedusingtheperturbativemethodsdescribedin
Section3.3,forthethirdMarkovprocessdescribedbefore(theonewithmemory)andforthemobility
history,respectively.Ineachﬁgure,fourplotscanbedistinguished:theprivacyenhancementintermsof
theentropyvalue,bothforShannonandentropyrateestimates,andforthetwoperturbativemethods
considered. Measuringtheprivacyenhancementbymeansoftwoentropyestimatesalowsoneto
diferentiatetheresultswhenonlyfrequency-basedinformationisconsidered(Shannon’sentropy)from
theconclusionsdrawnfromtime-baseddata(entropyrateestimate).
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For the case of the Markov process with memory in Figure 7, we can see that the privacy enhancement
is faster for the improved perturbative method, but only when no time-based information is considered.
Besides, it reaches the maximum privacy level (entropy value) when 35% of samples are replaced, a
value that lowers up to 25% when the improved perturbative method is used and no temporal information
is considered.
When this same analysis is applied to the mobility trace, the results are quite different, as shown in
Figure 8. In this case, as the cardinality of the alphabet is so high, it requires 100% of replacements in
order to obtain the highest privacy level, when measuring privacy as Shannon’s entropy. Besides, the
maximum entropy is only achieved when no temporal correlations are considered. In order to get the
maximum value for sequence-based data, many more samples would be needed in order to have precise
entropy estimation. In this case, it could be checked that the improved perturbation method does not
provide faster privacy enhancement for any case.
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5.2. Discussion
In the previous figures, the great difference between theory, with simple Markov processes, and real
scenarios, such as users mobility profiles, could be observed. However, where do these differences stem
from? Although the high cardinality of the alphabet and the complexity of the short- and long-term
dependencies of location histories play an important role, the probability distribution underneath the
mobility trace is also crucial. A great majority of visits are concentrated in two or three locations,
corresponding to home, work and the main points of interest of the user. Therefore, the probability
distribution is very biased toward certain locations. The improved perturbative method is based on
flattening the underlying distribution with as few replacements as possible in order to get closer to a
uniform distribution and, thus, to maximum entropy (i.e., privacy). When the number of categories
is not very high and the probability distribution is not very biased to a certain few categories, it is
easier to flatten it, as in the case of the Markov processes shown. However, in order to flatten the
mobility traces, we would have to compensate the visits to two or three locations through the rest of
the 500 different locations visited along the year. Although there are more than 10,000 samples, the
cardinality is still very high and would need many more samples to be flattened. This issue is even more
critical when considering not only the distribution of the visits, but the sequences of locations. If we
consider short-term dependencies (short sequences), we are neglecting important information, and even
in this case, the number of combinations is too high to compensate for the number of occurrences of
the most repeated sequences. Considering long-term dependencies (long sequences) leads to so many
combinations, that there are not enough samples to even calculate a good entropy estimate, even worse
if we try to flatten the block probability distribution.
The bias in the visits’ probability distribution carries an important consequence: for an attacker, it
is very easy to analyze a set of locations and determine where the main points of interest of the user
are. Therefore, these are very sensible data that must be masked. The bias can be leveraged in such a
way that, instead of trying to flatten all of the distribution, we could focus on the set of the most visited
locations and just flatten their number of visits, leaving the least-visited ones as they are. This way,
the uncertainty of which of the most visited locations is home or work increases with a smallnumber
of replacements. If the number of replacements is not critical or if we could fake the locations to be
disclosed, the approach could be to select some of the least visited locations and increase their number
of visits to make it comparable to the most visited places. However, as mentioned before, this strategy
will require a great number of replacements or additional fake locations. We should remark that adding
fake locations incurs battery and data traffic increases, thus being utility-related factors to be taken into
account when deciding which perturbative approach to follow.
In the case of location sequences, i.e., focusing on preserving the privacy of the correlations among
locations, improving such privacy without compromising the data utility (or avoiding additional cost
when adding fake samples instead of replacing the original ones) is more complicated and depends
heavily on the application at hand. As we observe in the figures, in order to obtain high privacy levels,
the fraction of location samples to change grows fast. Furthermore, the replacements should be done
wisely. For example, let a user be walking in Madrid. If, during the user’s location sampling, done by
the corresponding mobile application communicating with the LBS provider (done every few minutes),
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the system replaces a location in Madrid by another one in New York City (or just adds the location in
New York City in the mobility profile), an attacker could easily detect that it is not possible for a user to
make this large jump in such a short period of time. Therefore, this replacement/addition might seem to
theoretically improve greatly the privacy level (it is an unexpected movement, thus the entropy rate of
the mobility profile would be increased) with little disruption of the utility of the result (because just one
location was replaced/added and the system can ignore the result of the associated request, by knowing
it is a fake one). However, it would be easy for an attacker to notice the impossibility of the jump, due
to the recent past history, and ignore the location in New York. This happens when we are considering a
mobility profile, since location profiles on their own just account for the number of visits to each place,
leaving unnoticed this kind of impossible large jump between locations in a short period of time. We
can devise then a semantics and scale-related problem. What data do we want to preserve? For instance,
if only the work/home locations are the ones to be protected, the perturbation methods should focus on
replacing or adding samples of the same city repeatedly, so that their frequency is comparable to the one
of home/work locations. Since the places could be nearby, it would be more difficult for an attacker to
distinguish among the real and fake ones. However, if we want to preserve in which country the user
is, the perturbation mechanism needs to be more sophisticated to make the attacker believe that the user
might be at any of two countries by creating equally believable location profiles. Since we need to keep
the scope of this work bounded, we just analyzed the basic cases and made some considerations about
these interesting questions for further research.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one other work aiming
at preserving the information contained in the transitions among locations [40]. For the sake of
completeness, we finish up with a comparison of their results and ours. In Theodorakopoulos et al.’s
work, the goal is to design the optimal LPPM that takes the real locations to be protected together with
the previous fake ones sent to the LBS and selects, probabilistically, the fake locations to send next. In
order to obtain the optimal mechanism, they assume that the adversary already knows how the LPPM
works and, thus, will respond optimally to it. To design the optimal LPPM under these assumptions,
they use a Stackelberg game strategy. The design parameters are the privacy gain function, expressed as
the adversary’s error in estimating the real user location (i.e., the distance function mapping the value
assigned to the difference between the real user location and the one estimated by the adversary) and
the quality metric function (i.e., the quality loss incurred when each fake location is sent instead of the
corresponding real one). As we can see, the work exposed in [40] focuses on the LPPM design under
certain constraints, whereas in our work, the privacy metric is the main focus (since our obfuscation
mechanisms are mere heuristics to validate the proposed metric). Their work provides flexibility on the
privacy metric to use, as long as it can be expressed in terms of the distance between the location to
protect and the estimation of the adversary. Thus, it is dependent on the adversary behavior. In our
case, the privacy metric we propose is just dependent on the user mobility and, more specifically, on
her predictability. Entropy and the entropy rate are tightly coupled with this predictability concept,
as originally stated in [3]. Each user has a different maximum predictability (calculated based on
the entropy rate value), which corresponds to the maximum percentage of time a prediction algorithm
could correctly predict the next location of the user. Thus, more random users (i.e., users with higher
entropy values and, thus, lower predictability) could achieve higher privacy, independently of how well
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the adversary is able to infer their real locations. In other words, our privacy metric assumes that the
adversary applies the best prediction algorithm that could ever exist in order to infer the real location of
the user. This is somehow similar to what the authors in [40] assume to design their LPPM: the adversary
knows the LPPM and, thus, can respond optimally. In fact, we can see that the results obtained in both
cases behave very similarly: the privacy level (in their case, using the hamming distance as an illustrative
example) grows as the quality loss increases, until a certain point from which, although increasing the
quality (or utility) loss, the achieved privacy remains the same. This point is directly related to the
predictability of the user and, as also pointed out in [40], depends on the specific user, and it is not a
constraint of the system, but of the user mobility model itself.
Regarding the privacy-utility trade-off, the authors of [40] face it by including a function that reflects
the distance among the real location and the fake one that is calculated by their proposed LPPM. Then,
the quality (utility) loss is calculated by averaging the result of applying he function to each location
that needs to be disclosed for the LBS (and, thus, that can reach the attacker). The distance function
reflects which events have more impact on quality loss and also the different quality losses of different
outputs (fake locations) for each target location to be protected. However, they do not explicitly consider
the semantics of the locations and transitions among them, although they designed their LPPM to face
adversaries who can learn how the LPPM works at each step (thus, potentially being able to notice also
if the LPPM is replacing samples by other ones far away from the current one). Anyhow, the semantics
and correlation-related problem is shown to be crucial when assessing the real privacy obtained by the
LPPM and, thus, needs to be further investigated in future works.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we have analyzed privacy-enhancing mechanisms based on information theory concepts,
such as entropy, applied to locations and mobility profiling scenarios. Starting with synthetic and simple
processes, we have shown that the theory applicable to these low alphabet cardinality, memoryless
processes cannot be directly applied to more complex cases, such as the mobility profiles of users.
Therefore, the remarkable results obtained in the simpler case get degraded until little privacy
enhancement is observed, unless utility is completely lost.
The main reasons leading to these results are the increase in the alphabet cardinality (from a few
categories to hundreds of visited places by a user) and the temporal dependencies introduced by the
fact of considering mobility profiles instead of set of independent samples (location profiles), which
leads to the need for using general privacy metrics, such as the one proposed in this work, based on the
information theory concept of the entropy rate, in order to consider the temporal dependencies of the
mobility profiles. Moreover, the probability density function underneath in the mobility profile of a user
is highly biased toward certain frequently-visited places, which makes it difficult to hide these locations
just by replacing the rest of the samples by random locations.
As discussed earlier, careful replacement methods should be studied for these special cases. An
interesting future research line might be to investigate how to replace samples taking into account the
current and past locations, in order to provide reasonable replacements and to exploit the biases toward
the most visited locations to flatten the probability distribution, since these locations and their visitation
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profiles are the keys to identify the user behind such profiles. Another interesting aspect to explore is the
usefulness of alternative measures of uncertainty, such as the Rènyi entropy and the variance, in order to
assess the privacy of mobility profiles.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For each t (with p(t) > 0) and each s,
pS0jT (sjt) = (1  ) pSjT (sjt) +  1k ;
where k is the cardinality of the alphabet of S. Due to the concavity of the entropy and the fact that
uniform distributions maximize it, for all t,
H(S 0jt) > (1  ) H(Sjt) +  log k > H(Sjt);
where H(Sjt) denotes the entropy of S given T = t and similarly for S 0. Taking expectations on t,
H(S 0jT ) > H(SjT ). Clearly, equality holds only when  = 0, or else, when S given t is uniformly
distributed, regardless of t, i.e., p(sjt) = 1
k
= p(s).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We prove the statement for the nontrivial case when  > 0. In Lemma 1, take S = X0, S 0 = X 00
and T = (X 1; : : : ; X m); thus
H(X 00jX 1; : : : ; X m) > H(X0jX 1; : : : ; X m);
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with equality if and only ifX0 is uniform and independent of (X 1; : : : ; X m). Next, observe thatX 00 and
(X 0 1; : : : ; X
0
 m) are conditionally independent given (X 1; : : : ; X m). Apply the conditional-entropy
form of the data processing inequality to write:
H(X 00jX 0 1; : : : ; X 0 m) > H(X 00jX 1; : : : ; X m);
with equality if and only if X 00 and (X 1; : : : ; X m) are conditionally independent given
(X 0 1; : : : ; X
0
 m). Combine both inequalities to immediately conclude the assertions in the theorem
regarding m past samples. The claims on the limit of m for entropy rates follow the same proof, with
S = X0, S 0 = X 00 and T = (X 1; X 2; : : : ).
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. In uniform replacement, a sample Xn will be effectively perturbed when replacement occurs,
with probability , and the replacement sample Un does not match the original one. Precisely,
 = PfXn 6= X 0ng = (1  PfXn = Ung):
Because Xn and Un are independent and Un is uniform,
PfUn = Xng = EXn PfUn = XnjXng = 1=jX j:
If the original process X is not independent, uniformly distributed, all samples must be replaced to
make it so, thereby maximizing the entropy rate. Consequently, crit = 1, and crit can be obtained from
the relationship between  and  above, simply by setting  = 1.
As for improved replacement, we resort to Theorem 2 in [38] and the concept of critical redundancy,
which takes on the value 1  1jX jpmax in the notation of this work. According to this, for any  > 1  1jX jpmax ,
the PMF of the replaced samples Rn is:
r(x) =
1

1
jX j +

1  1


p(x):
Proceeding as in the first part of this proof,
 = (1  PfXn = Rng);
but now:
PfXn = Rng =
X
x
p(x) r(x);
from which the expression for  in the second part of the theorem follows.
For i.i.d. processes, the problem is mathematically equivalent to that formulated in [38], and crit
becomes the critical redundancy defined shortly before Theorem 2 in the cited work, in the form
expressed in the statement of the theorem we prove here.
The case for processes with memory requires complete replacement to achieve the independence of
the samples, not merely uniform distribution, just as in the case of uniform replacement. However, for
 = 1, the replacement strategy Rn becomes uniform, and the analysis for uniform replacement above
applies here, as well.
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